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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAKlEL R. 1fl~LLEN,
Plaintiff and AJJpcllant,

I

YS.

I XDl 'STRIAL C01L\USSION OF
l-TA!l, lTTAlf RICHARDSON
HOOFIXG and 'rHI£ STA'l'E
IX0lTRAl\CJ1~ FPND,
Dcfcnda11ts and Respondents.

\

~

Case No.
10795

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STA'l'I~trENT

OF FACTS

Suhs<'qc1ent to the filing of plaintiff's claim with
tlw Industrial Commission, a hearing was had on this
matter on November 17, 1965. The plaintiff testified that
he was the sole owner and proprietor of Utah Richardson Roofing and had been in the roofing contracting
business since 1947. In connection with such occupation
it<' t('Stifit>d that the job of roofing was extreme physical
wor 1.;:. (R 2-1:). Prior to the date of the alleged accident
on ,June 23, 1965, the plaintiff had experienced chest
1

pams which h(' felt
(R. 2G).

\\'<'l't'

eitl1e1· µ;as pains or pkurisy.

On the :2:i1d day of .June, J 9Gj, the applicant was
working on a flat rnof in Salt Lake County. (R ?iO).
There \\'a8 nothing ahnormal about tlw particular job
a8 trstified hy the plaintiff. (R. 32):
Q. "X ow isn't it a fact on this :23rd day of
.June, 1965, the \\'Ol'k ;·ou we1·e doing wa8 the
normal work that you do on a roof?
A. Yes, sir."

The plaintiff testified that both on the :?.3rd of .Tum•,
1965, and prior when he felt the pains in his chest, the
pains did not necessitate his leaving the job ( R ::33-3-1-),
and that, in fact, he left the jobsite because he had completed his work for that day. (R. ::3-± ). In addition to
the pains that he felt earlier that day, pain was prrsent
at approximately 3 :00 p.m. when he was not on the roof
working, but he was rather driving one of his vehicles
to the shop. (R. 34). The pain that precipitated the call
for medical attention occurred in the evening at his honw
when the pain became most seven' and his siieech became
incoherent.
Subsequent to this hearing the Industrial Commission, pursuant to 35-1-77 UCA 1953 as amended, submitted the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel
and pursuant to its charge the panel initiated an investigation. The panel report (R. -!G) states, in part, as
follows:
'' The contents of the file from the Industrial
Commission has been revic~wed and extracted, and
2

each of tlw panel meHilwn; singly have reviewed
the information available. Th<:' patient was exami1wd liy each panel member, and discussion with
{'Valuation of the situation by the panel as a
group has been acomplished . . . ''
1n the medical panel report on file herein, dated
April 1, 1966 (R. 46) on the first page, the doctors

reviewed the history of the case immediately prior to
the occurrence of June 23, 1965. No objection is made
to this review, however, on pag<-> two of the medical
pnn<->l report tht>~v state that in examining the patient
he related an occurrence of June 21, 1965, when, after
supper, at apprnximately 9 :00 p.m. he had an anginal
pain that was so seven· that codeine had been taken for
rC'liPf of the pain. Based upon this fact and upon tht·
pain experience of June 19, 19G5, the panel found that
the plaintiff had symptoms directly related to his heart
disease bdore the date of the alleged accident or injury.
At n subsequent hearing on the 6th day of July,
1%(), the plaintiff again testified as to the type of pains
he had experienced prior to the 23rd day of June, 1965.
Prior to this tt•stirnony Dr. Kilpatrick, the chairman of
Uw im·dical panel rPport, h•shfied at this hearing and
upon cross-examination b~' Mr. Black, related what the
plaintiff had told him when he was obtaining the plaintiff's medical histon·. The Doctor testified (R. 63) in
1iart, as follows:
Q. ''\\'hat did he tell you?
A. . .. '11 hat lw had on the night of the 19th
of .JunP a severe pain in his chest, and he wasn't
t•xactly sure what it was. He surmised that it was
3

indigestion, and he had available some codeinP
tablets that he had on hand from a previous pa.in
that he had had several yPars lwfore witlt his
hack, and he took one of the::-;e, and aftn awhile
his pain subsided and he WPnt on about his usual
work."
After the plaintiff had described these prior paim;
and in effect denied th<c' occunence that he had previously related to the Doctor on the 19th day of ,June,
Dr. Kilpatrick was again called in to testify and was
asked whether or not these factual experiences related
hy Mr. 1f ellen changed the Doctor's opinion (R 77):
"1\fr. Moore: I haw• one more question of Dr.
Kilpatrick, if I may.

Mr. Moore: Dr. Kilpatrick, is there anything
:vou have heard today, subsequent testimony, that
would change your opinions that are contained
in the Medical Report~
Dr. Kilpatrick: No, sir."
1'herefore, the point made by plaintiff in his Statemmt
of Facts on page six (G) wherein he stated that "there
is no substantiation in the record for the alwi;e statement
as to a severe attack on June 21, 1965," is academic. Dr.

Kilpatrick explained that the vanel report based its
factual history upon the plaintiff's statement and therefore the statements contained within the said report
are certainly proper. Notwithstanding this, the Doctor
clearly concluded that his basic opinion had not been
changed by Mr. Mellen's subsequent explanation.
Subsequent to the findings of the nwdical pam•l report referred to above, the plaintiff timely filt'd objee4

ti on to the n~1Jort ( R. 5:3), \\'hi ch occasioned the hearing

on .July G, 19G6. rrhe record shows ( R. 67, 68) that the
111Pdical panel }'(•port was properly adrnHted into evidence based upon proper oral testimony as required by
35-1-77 UCA 1953 as amended. It should be noted that
no ohjertion was made to its admission.

'l'he pant>l report is clear that the opm10n of the
three physicians appointed was that the applicant's
heart condition was not due to work activities, but rather,
tlwy found that the plaintiff had "a natural evolution
of a degenerative process in his heart, which culminated
in an attack of pain and apparent collapse on or about
7 :00 p.rn. while at home on the night of .June 23, 1965."
BasPcl upon the fads of prior pain "long before the day
of tlw alk•ged injury," the panel concluded that these
pains indicated that the plaintiff's present incapacity
\\·as due to the pre-existing heart disease and was not
related to hi:,.; work.
Dr. Charles D. Behrens, the treating physician,
disagrePd with the medical panel and felt that the work
rondition8 of the applicant aggravated the heart condition. Dr. Behrens did agree with the medical panel in
that the plaintiff had been suffering for a long time with
a lwart disease. (R. 9-t ). Dr. Behrens admitted in his
tPstimony that a person suffering from this long standing- disea:,.;e would not have been required to have any
particular aetivit:v trigger the condition which resulted
in the plaintiff's present disability. After Dr. Behrens
te8tifit•d as to his opinion, Dr. Kilpatrick was again recallPcl to tt•stify and was asked whether or not Dr.
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Behren::;' testimony, including his opm1on, and ba~P<l
upon the fact that he ,,-as the treating physician, varied
his testimony. Again, Dr. Kilpatrick stated that his
opinion had not changed. (R 101).
The statP of the record is clt>ar that tlwre is a disagreement of medical ovinion. Both physicians who
testified considert'd que::;tions presentPd to them on
whether or not the work activities precipitated a pn•existing condition and they disagreed with each other.
Dr. Kilpatrick admitted that a myocordial infarction
"could have been caused" by the work activities, however, the record is clear (see medical panel report) that
it was the panel's opinion that the disability of thf~
plaintiff was due to the pre-existing condition which
was not aggravated by his working activities.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
WAS NOT CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE
AND WAS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

It is respectfully submittPd that

plaintiff ha:s
created two strawmen in order to sustain his position
that the Industrial Conunission 's award should be reversed. Initially, the plaintiff claims that the Industrial
Commission and the medical panel made its findings
based upon the fact that the plaintiff is re(1uired to show
unusual exertion as a direct cause of thr~ alleged injury.
Nowhere in the record and, in particular, in the Order
herein (R. 103) is there any reference to the fact that

6

tht:~

till' iilaintiH's daim was drnied l>el'ause the plaintiff

!'ailed to show facts of unusual Pxertion. The statement
;11 plaintiff's hrid, that tlw medical panel interpreted
('rroneousl:-,' the law, is without foundation. The medical
pmwl, in effect, made two findings. One, that prior to
.J mw 2:3, 19G5, the plaintiff had prior pains which were
<·om;istrnt with his admitted pre-existing conditions.
'l1 wo, that from the record it appeared clear that there
was no relationship between the infarction and his work
activities. Based upon these findings and opinions, the
medical panel concluded that the applicant's present disability due to heart disease cannot be considered to be
of industrial origin.
The plaintiff relies upon the fact that the panel
c·onsidered th<' applicant's work activities in arriving at
the muse for his disability. The medical panel, in stating
that "the aetnal work ht> was doing was no different
that he> had lwen arcustomed to for a number of years,"
'''Hs simpl~, rorrohorating their finding that the appliennt 's difficultie:s were not aggravated by his working
eondition:s, but rather that his disability was due to a
natnrn l Pvolntion of a degenerative condition and that
the panel eould find no definite occurrence traceable to
11 particular incident.
As stated above, no place in the record did either
tlw medieal panel members or the Industrial Commission
hasl' tlwir eonclusion on the fact that the plaintiff failed
to show unusual exertion.
Plaintiff has eited and relies upon the Utah case of
f'111it.11 IJisrnit Cmnz)((ny, et al, v. The lndustri.al Com-
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et al, (19+9) 115 Utah 1, :201

'l'l1(·
dPfendants do not disagTl'e with thP holding of this ca::;(:
and further agn~e that it is not rn•cessary to :,;how unusual exertion in thes(~ ca~ws, hut that all that is nec\~::i
sary is a showing that the work activiti('s pn·eipitated
the resulting disability or injury. The Pmity Biscuit
case, however, is clearly distinguishable from tliis ca::;e.
'l'he most ohvious distinction was the i::;sue prest:•nted to
the Supreme Court in that easP. The Industrial Commission ruled in the applicant's favor and th<> issue
1n·esented therefor, ~was whetht>r or not its Order was
arbitrary and capricious and should be overturned. In
this case, the Industrial Commission denied the applicant's claim.
m1ss1011,

P~d 9()].

Secondly, m the Purity Biscuit case, the medical
evidence showed that the work activities of the applicant
were directly related to the resulting disability. Such
evidence was clear. The issue presented was the faet
that there was no unusual activity and therefore, it wa1<
argued, as a matter of law, that the award should have
been reversed. In making its ruling, the Court held that
an unexpected internal failure precipitated by work activities was sufficient to fall within the definition of accident, as contained in Section 35-1-GO, PCA 1953 as
amended. The Purity Biscuit case cannot be read nor
interpreted to mean that the requirements of an accirlrnt
is not the test of whether or not compensation should he
received. In other words, it is clear that to allow compensation for all complaints, without a requirement of an
accident occurring, would violate the legislative purpose
of the Workmen's Compensation Act and would, in effect,
8

diangt• the cov(•rage from aeeidental henefits to a health
and welfan· polie.v insurance. In this case the Industrial
Commission held, in effect, that the applicant failed to
prove an accident. Since an early Utah case, Tavey
v. Industrial Commission, 106 Utah 489, 150 P2d 379,
the Utah Court has held accident to mean an unforeseen
happening or unex1wcted mishap, that is, "an event not
within one's foresight and expectation resulting in a
mishap causing injury." In a recent Utah case, Cnrling
v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P2d 202,
a similar issue to that present in this case was presented
to this Court, that is, whdher or not the Industrial
Commission erred in finding that the applicant's disability was clue from a gradual deterioration or rather
a single incident in conm~ction with his work. The Court
discusses the nPed for the requirement of an accident
as follows :
(1, 2) The ~Workmen's Compensation Act,
Section :15-1--1-5, UCA 1953, as amended, provides
for an award to an employee"* * ~·who is injured
* '1' '/.' hy acci.dcnt arising out of or in the course
of his employment * * * ." There is no further
definition of the term "accident," but this court
has held that for the purpose of the Act it should
be given a broad meaning. It connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in the
usual course of events. We recognize the correctness of plaintiff's contention that even though
there must be some such "accident" within the
meaning of that statute, this is not necessarily
r<>stricted to some single incident which happened
suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude the possibility that due to exertion,
str<»ss or other repetitive cause, a climax might
9

lil' rPaeht•d in such manner as to prn1wrl,Y fall
\\-ithin tho dPfinition of an accident as just nhove.'
Ho\H'Vl'l" sneh an oeemTencP must lw distinguished from graduall~- developing conditions
which are classified as oc·enpational disemws and
which are not compensahh~ l'xcept as provickd in
Cha pt Pr 2 of Tit le :35 (Sections ~35-2-l, et seq.),

rcA 1953."

It is clear in this record and, in fact, undisputed that thP
applicant had a SPVPrt' pre-existing condition. On page
68 of the record the evidence clearly shows the type of
developing disease thP applicant was suffering from:

MR. MOORE: Q. "Now, Doctor, when a pt•rson has the tnie of hPart disease that the applicant has in this case, you mentioned once that
there is a predestination that thPl'l' will be an
occurronce. "What did you mean by that ?
A. That is the nature of arteriosclerotie
!wart di:wase. It's a slowl:v dPveloping proces::;,
and s011w rwovh' an· subject to it and others IHI'
not (
0

Q. Now assuming that you have this disease,
are you liable or more likely to have an infarction~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And may this infarction be brought about
by activities not conneeted \\-ith work !
0

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can it be brought about by normal living
activities~

A. True.
Q. And can this lw brought ahout "·lien n
lH'l'SOn PVPn he l't'Sting?
A. Right.
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Q. And it could he brought about when he
1s in his :,;leep?
A. Corn~ct.
Q. And it's common that this occurs?
A. In the general population it is.

Q. And it's common that it occurs in the
t;·pe of ::;ituation of the age and condition of the
Applicant in this case?
A. That is true.
Q. Then in your opinion was this heart condition brought on bPcause of the peculiarity of
his workJ
A. '11 he Panel considered that, and he was
quite explanatory in our discussion with him
about the worries connected with the job, and the
difficulties in getting jobs finished, which we
considered to be more-or-less par for the course
in this kind of work. That he was an owner-contractor, and that would to be considered part of
the job.
Q. Now as a practical matter, he had a
similar attack about a week earlier 1
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And isn't it more likely that once you
hav(' an attack, that a second one will come quicker
than if you wouldn't have had the first one?
A. \Vell, 1 can't answer that. That is true,
hut ·we are not certain exactly when he had the
coronary thrombosis, or ·when he had the infarction. He might have had it several days before
this incident.
Q. But he described an incident, which ap1wared to describe this sort of a condition, a week
earlier?

11

A. \Vell, apparently it \\·as an atta<:'k of at
lt•ast angina 1wctoris. It \ms t~·pieall;· descriptive. \VIwtlwr or not he had his actual thrombosis
then, we are not able to say that. 'l'll(_' only thing
we can sa;· is that the first examination he had,
and tlw first t>lectrocardiograrn, demonstrated a
\\·ell-(•stahlished infarction already present.
Q. And when hP had this otlwr attack is
when lH~ was at home'?

A. True. He had certainl,\· what is described
as angina pectoris.
Q. Yes. Now wlwn you are at hmrn~, sitting
down and thinking about the pressures of life,
this could bring on this sort of a situation'!

A. Surely. ''
Thus, the record is dear that the ap1llicant's preexisting condition was such, that a disabling heart attack
of the nature that the applicant suffered, could havP
been brought on by activit,\· outside of his employment
and fnrtlwr could liavl' been preeipitated hy no krnmn
activity. The a1>plicant's treating physician agrees ·with
snch position. (R. 9-1).
Q. "Now this tnw of eondition develop:'
over what period of time?
A.
ell, I don't think that we can say definitely. Probably over a lifetimP.

"r

Q. A lifetime'!
A. (Nodding lwa(l

lll

the affirmative.)

Q. Isn't it connnon, with a person that ha,;
this condition, that an,\· sort of strain - w01T;·
or concern, on or off tlw joh - may preeipitatl'
an infarction 'I
A. (Nodding head in the affirmativr.)
12

(~. ls that correct?
A. Yes.

(~. And in fact an infarction can occur without any reeognizable worry or stress, if you have
this condition; is that correct?
A. Yes.

Q. In fact this is common?
A. Y~~s.
(~. In many instances people with this condition wakP u11 in the middle of the night with
an infarction; is that correct?
A. Yes.

Q. And therefore, if you have this type of
condition, it's not necessary to precipitate an
infarction that you have any particular trauma
or worry; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now prior to June 23, 1965, the patient
related to you that he had some chest pain; is
that eorrect?
A. Yes.
Q. And did he tell you for how long preceding the 23rd of J nne, 1965, that he had this chest
pain?
A. ~f y recollection is that it had been for a
1wriod of two to three days preceding this.
Q. And di<l he tell you what precipitated the
first chest pain'?
A. I don't recall.

Q. Now assuming that he had a chest pain
approximately three to five days prior to the
:23rd - in the evening time, when he was sleeping - what would you diagnose, or what would
you state was the cause of that chest pain~

13

.\. Th(• eansu \1·,ntl(l
to tlw lll.'·oeardinrn.

]1,.

insnffi('i(•nt o\:,\·µ:('ll

Q. And is it possil>le that an infarction could
havP OCCUITPd at that till!(' r A mild infarrtion:
A. It's possihlP."

Tlw deft>ndants feel it appropriatP to state the hold.
ing of' Thom((S Der· ill rmorial Associatirm, ct al, r. Tlie
Industrial Commission, ...... Utah ...... , 1:l8 P:2d :2:13,
wherein thP Court stntPd:
do not intPnd to OJH'n thP doo1· to rt-·
<·owr.'· for all in,jm;\'S of this t,\-]H' (s1waking
ahout heart attaek vasPs) 111PrelY because th<'Y
o(·r·m· on tlw premisPs of the empl~yPr during t!t.e
h01ns of tlw Pmplo.'·11wnt. In such case tlw Com·
mission would be warranted in n·quiring rlear and
convinring proof that the claim<>d injury resulterl
ht>cuusP of tllP extra \\·ork or over-rxertion, mer<>l.1·
showing a possibilit.'· of such a causr and effect
will not suffice.''
"\\~p

'l'lw plaintiff state's

in

his hril'f that tlH· cast- of

.low's et al ... L California Packing Corvoration (1952)
1:21 Ptah Gl'.2. :2-~+ P:2d G-t.O. is clNH authority for a I'P·
versal in this matter. Tlw clef endants disagT('<'. In thl'
Jones case the state of thP medical testimony was far
different than it was in this <'ase. ln that casP hrn (2)
doctors kstified on behalf of tlw applicant that tht·
occlusion n':'mltPd from tlH· \rnrk activities. 1'ht> on!~·
<>vidPnr0 to n~but this tlwor~· was a doctor that tpstifirrl
that it is i>ossibly relatPd hut that lw could not form an
opinion. AR sueh, of cmusP, the ch•nial \Ya~ not allO\n•(I
to stand. In this particular easp th<' parn·l found tltnt
th<> canst> of tlw disability wa:-: th<' pn•-existing disP11~1·
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and not the work activities. They found further that the
work activities did not aggravate or precipitate the heart
attack. rrhe statement of Dr. Kilpatrick's that the work
a('tivitic~:o "could have" caused the disability is taken out
of l'Onkxt and tlw tnw effect of his testimony shows
that there is silllply a dispute between medical doctors.
Therefore, the Commission's Order which adopted one
position certainly cannot be considered arbitrary and
enpriciou:-;. 8ee Burton 1·. The luclustrial Commission,
1:3 l'tah :2d 353, 37-! P2d -1:39 .
.Much to do is made of the fact that Mr. Mellen testified that he did not have an attack at home in the evening

prior to June 23, 1965. The panel, of course, obtained
this information from the applicant himself. N otwithstarnling this fact, after .Mr. Mellen had testified, Dr.
Kilpatrick stated that sueh testimony did not vary his
( ondusions. lt is reRpPctfully suggested that Jones v.
Culiforniu Packing Corporation, sitpra, is not in point
and the Commission's Ordt>r :;;hould be sustained.
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CON CL PS I():.,'
The Conm1ission's Ordrr lwn•in shonkl lw sm.;tain<>d
for the following reasons:
l. That the plaintiff failt-d to sustain his burdt-n
showing that an accidt-nt had occmTed.

111

2. That the Commission did not hold that the applicant need prove unusual exertion.
3. 'l1hat tlw Commission's action m believing tlH·
medical panel as oppost-d to lwlieving the applicant'~
treating physician is not arhitrar~- and eapricious.
Resp(•ctfully submitted,
ROBERT D. ~fOORE
-t22 Contirn•ntal Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Defrndrmfs.
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